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I. STATEMENT OF T m  CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case. 
In 2002, appellant Boise Tower Associates ("BTA") was constructing a 25-story 
condominium tower called the Boise Tower Project (the "Project") in downtown Boise, Idaho. 
On November 8,2002, respondent Timothy J. Hogland ("Hogland"), a s  the director of the Boise 
Planning and Development Services Department (the "Building Department"), issued a stop 
work order that halted construction of the Project. On November 19, 2002, Hogland allowed 
construction of the Project to continue but only if the Building Department was granted the right 
to approve BTA's financing ibr the Project. On February 11, 2003, Hogland, without any 
hearing, rejected BTA's proposed financing for the Project and revoked BTA's building permit. 
Although the City Council of the City of Boise (the "City") reinstated the permit on April 9, 
2003, the Project never recovered from the adverse publicity that followed Hogland's actions. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
BTA filed suit against Hogland and the City under 42 U.S.C. $1983 and for the tortious 
interference with BTA's contractual relations. The Honorable Darla Williamson, Fourth Judicial 
District, granted the respondents' summary judgment motion and dismissed all of BTA's claims. 
The District Court also denied BTA's partial summary judgment motion that Hogland and the 
City were liable under 42 U.S.C.$1983 in depriving BTA of its procedural due process rights. 
BTA appeals the denial of its partial summary judgment and the dismissal of its claims under 42 
U.S.C. $1983, its tort claims for interference with contractual relations, and its takings claim. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 1 
C. Statement of Facts. 
i. Issuance of the Building Permit. 
On November 27, 1998, BTA submitted an application to the Building Department for a 
I building permit for the shell and core of the building on the Project. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2 
(Affidavit of Christopher Burke in Support of Boise Tower's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment), Ex. A (transcript of deposition of Timothy Hogland), p. 63,l. 12 - p. 65,l. 4 and Ex. 
1 
I 47. The Building Department approved BTA's application and issued a building permit on May 
3,2000. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 75,l. 25 - p. 78,l. 9 and Ex. 51. BTA requested, and 
the Building Department granted, a 180-day extension of its building permit until June 14,2000. 
R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 87,l. 13 - p. 90, 1. 20; R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3 (Afildavit of 
Fredrick Peterson in Support of Boise Tower's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment), 7 4. 
Under Section 106.4.4 of the 1994 Uniform Building Code ("uBc")', a building permit expires 
I 
if construction does not begin within 180 days after issuance of the permit or if the work is 
I suspended or abandoned for a period of 180 days. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, Ex. 46, p. 1-6- 
I 
1-7. 
BTA commenced construction work on the Project prior to June 14, 2001, sufficient to 
keep its building permit in force and effect. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex A., p. 92, 11. 4-20; R. 
Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3, 7 4. BTA continued with construction work on the Project between June 
2001 and May 2002, at which time work was temporarily halted until construction financing 
could be manged. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A,p. 110,ll. 7-10; R. Vol. 1,p. 142, Ex. 3,f 4. 
' A complete copy of the 1994 Unifonn Building Code ("UBC") as adopted by the City was attached as Ex. 46 to 
the deposition of Timothy Hogland which was attached as Ex. A to the Affidavit of Christopher Burke in Support of 
Boise Tower's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which is Ex. 2 to the Clerk's Record in this appeal. Timothy 
Hogland testified at his deposition that the 1994 UBC was the official building code for the City of Boise applicable 
to the building permit at issue in this matter. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 74, 11. 6-25. For the conveniencc of 
the Court, a copy of Chapter 1 of the UBC entitled "Administration" is attached as an Addendum to this brief. 
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On May 15,2002, concrete was poured for the foundation of the Project. That work was 
reported in an inspection report prepared by Materials Testing and Inspection ("MTI"), dated 
May 15, 2002. MTI was an independent inspector contracted by the Building Department to 
inspect work on the Project. A copy of MTI's May 151h inspection report was sent by MTI to the 
Building Department and was contained in its business records. Hogland and the City do not 
now dispute that the work described in that report was performed on the Project on May 15, 
2002. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3, f 6 and Ex. A; R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 113,l. 16-23, p. 
117,1.19-p.118,1.4,p.123,1.13-p.125,1.11,p.126,1.23-p.127,1. 16,andEx.57. 
ii. BTA 's Finance and Construction Progress. 
During the summer of 2002, BTA was introduced to Marshall Investments Corporation 
("Marshall"), a construction lender from Minneapolis, Minnesota, with which BTA's general 
contractor, Mortenson, had had significant prior experience. BTA and Mortenson had a number 
of meetings with Marshall, during which Marshall verbally committed to put together funding 
for the Project that would be constructed by Mortenson. On October 7, 2002, BTA received 
from Marshall a proposal for a construction loan in the amount of $39,350,000. A requirement 
to close that loan was that BTA have executed presales agreements with buyers for 63 residential 
units. At the time, BTA already had at least 60 presales agreements. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3,7 7 
and Ex. B. 
BTA and Mortenson were sufficiently optimistic about Marshall's funding proposal and 
commitment to fund the loan that they entered into a new construction contract on October 25, 
2002. Mortenson also committed to restart construction on the Project immediately, pending 
funding of the loan by Marshall, and to pay the interim construction costs until Marshall closed 
the loan. Based on this commitment and execution of the new MortensonIBTA general contract, 
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BTA authorized Mortenson to immediately resume construction work on the Project. R. Vol. I, 
p. 142, Ex. 3, n 8. 
On November 7, 2002, Mortenson delivered to Hogland a letter noti&ing the Building 
Department of Mortenson's intention to resume construction on the Project on November 7th. R. 
Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3, 7 8 and Ex. C. Hogland received the letter and understood from it that 
Mortenson was going to restart construction on the Project immediately. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, 
Between May and November 2002, Hogland had received substantial pressure to do 
something about the Project. He testified in his deposition: 
Q. During that time period, May through November of 2002, did any 
representative of the City advocate or recommend that the building permit 
be canceled or revoked? 
A. There certainly was a lot of public opinion about this thing sitting there. It 
was causing all kinds of problems. There was newspaper s W ,  there were 
people calling the city council. And at a city council meeting a council 
member indicated: What are you going to do about this? Something has 
to be done about this. This can't go on like this. They are getting lots of 
phone calls. 
R. Vol. 1,p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A,p. 130,ll. 5-17. 
iii. Stor, Work Order. 
On November 8, 2002, the day following Mortenson's November 7" letter, the Building 
Department served upon BTA and Mortenson a notice directing BTA and Mortenson to stop all 
work on the Project "until a meeting with [the Buildmg Department] has been completed and a 
course of action agreed upon." Neither Boise nor Hogland had any discussion with BTA, or 
provided BTA with any notice or an opportunity to be heard, before issuing the notice. R. Vol. I, 
p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 137,l. 3 -p. 138; R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3,7 9 and Ex. D. 
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Hogland admitted in his deposition that he issued the November 8th notice based upon 
the faulty assumption that work had last been performed on the Project on May 3,2002, and that 
BTA's building permit had expired on November 8, 2002 because of the failure to do work 
within 180 days. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 138,4 - p. 140,l. 11, p. 203,l. 21 - p. 204,l. 
3. Hogland also admitted that if, in fact, work was performed on the Project on May 15,2002, as 
indicated by the MTI inspection report, 180 days would not have run until November 11, 2002, 
and therefore, the building permit bad not expired as of November 8th. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, 
Ex.A,p.224,1. 16-p.225,l. 17andEx.57. 
iv. The Stiaulation. 
After receiving the November 8th stop work notice, Rick Peterson of BTA and Chuck 
Rauch, project manager for Mortenson, had meetings with Hogland, during which Hogland first 
advised them that BTA's building permit had expired for lack of construction activity within 180 
days. Hogland told them in those meetings that he would extend the building permit for another 
60 days if BTA satisfied a number of conditions, including providing the Building Department 
with a loan commitment to finance construction of the Project. Peterson and Rauch told Hogland 
that the 180-day period had not lapsed, 
the 180-day period. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3,7 10; R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 146,ll. 5-17. 
Peterson requested that Hogland investigate his records further before making any final decision 
on the building permit. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3,1[ 10. Hogland refused. He told Peterson that 
BTA would have to sign a written stipulation establishing conditions under which BTA would be 
permitted to resume work under the building permit. He also told Peterson that the consequence 
for failing to meet those conditions by the deadline stated in the stipulation would be the 
expiration of the permit. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 142,l. 25 - p. 143,l. 25; R. Vol. I, p. 
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142, Ex. 3, 7 10. Hogland also refbsed to allow BTA to proceed with any work on the Project 
unless or until BTA agreed to the conditions of that stipulation. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 
144,ll. 8-12; R. Vol. I, p. 142, EX. 3,7 10. 
On November 19, 2002, Hogland presented Rick Peterson of BTA with a written 
stipulation. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3, Ex. E. Hogland told Peterson on that date that if he did not 
sign the stipulation as drafted, Hogland would tell the City Council at that night's City Council 
meeting that BTA's building permit had expired. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 153,l. 15 - 
p. 154, 1. 12; R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3, 7 11. Peterson protested. He told Hogland that Peterson's 
attorney had advised him not to sign the stipulation. Peterson further told Hogland that if 
Hogland or the City publicly announced that the building permit had expired, the adverse 
publicity would do serious damage to the Project. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3, 7 11; R. Vol. I, p. 142, 
Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 153,l. 15 - p. 155,l. 6. Peterson told Hogland that canceling the building permit 
would jeopardize his financing and cause BTA to lose condominium pre-sales. R. Vol. I, p. 142, 
Ex. 3, 7 11. Mr. Peterson firmly believed at that time that if Hogland or Boise publicly 
announced cancellation or expiration of the building permit, the Project would come to an abrupt 
end. Id. When Hogland continued to insist that Peterson sign the stipulation, Peterson did so on 
November 19,2002, but only after Hogland told him that if he did not sign it, Hogland would tell 
the City Council the permit had expired. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 156,ll. 7-11; R. Vol., 
I, p. 142, Ex. 3,7 11. The stipulation signed by Peterson and Hogland required BTA to provide a 
loan commitment, approved by the City, for full financing of the Project within 60 days from the 
date of the agreement, or the building permit would be deemed expired. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3, 
Ex. E. 
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On January 22, 2003, Hogland and Rick Peterson signed a written addendum to the 
November 19, 2002 stipulation, purporting to extend until February 4, 2003, the time within 
which BTA had to furnish a loan commitment for full financing to Boise, and providing that a 
loan for full financing must close no later than March 4,2003. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 
183,l. 17 - p. 184,l. 12 and Ex. 68. The addendum also provided that the failure to satisfy these 
conditions would result in cancellation of the building permit. Id. Peterson believed &at he had 
no choice but to sign the addendum to the stipulation, because if he did not, Boise would cancel 
the building permit and the Project would likely come to an end. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3,f 15. 
On or about January 10, 2003, BTA delivered to the Building Department a signed loan 
commitment from Marshall to fund construction of the Project. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 
162, 1. 3 - p. 163, 1. 18 and Ex. 63. On or about January 21, 2003, ETA delivered a letter to 
Hogland enclosing another copy of the Marshall loan commitment and a loan commitment from 
Washington Capital Management, Inc. ("Washington Capital"). In that letter, BTA indicated 
that Washington Capital was willing to renew the attached loan commitment depending upon the 
City's approval. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 177,ll. 10-18 and Ex. 66; R. Vol. I, p. 142, 
Ex. 3, f 12 and Ex. F. The letter also stated: 
Please provide BTA with your written approval of one or both commitments. In 
the event, you do not approve a commitment, please detail the reasons for the lack 
of approval and provide BTA with an opportunity to respond. 
R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3, Ex. F. On or about January 31, 2003, BTA furnished the Building 
Department with a new signed loan commitment &om Washington Capital. R. Vol. I, p. 142, 
Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 188,ll. 3-23 and Ex. 70. 
Hogland and the Building Department rejectcd the January 1 0 ~  Marshall loan 
commitment. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 167,l. 11 - p. 168,l. 22; R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3, 
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f 13. The Building Department requested some changes in the Washington Capital loan 
commitment. While BTA, Washington Capital, and the City were discussing these changes, 
Washington Capital advised Hogland that it deemed the loan commitment expired and no longer 
ineffect. R.Vol.1,~. 142,Ex.2,Ex.A,p. 191,Sl.S-p. 194,l. lS;R.Vol.I,p. 142,Ex. 3,5[ 16. 
v. Permit Revocation. 
On February 11, 2003, Hogland delivered to Rick Peterson a letter advising BTA that its 
building permit had been canceled, or deemed expired, because BTA had failed to satisfy the 
condition of the stipulation requiring a signed loan commitment for full funding within the 
specified time period. Boise did not give BTA any hearing before canceling BTA's permit on 
February 11,2003. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 208,l. 9 - p. 209,l. 14 and Ex. 75; R. Vol. 
I, p. 142, Ex. 3,f 17. 
Before Hogland had given his letter to BTA, Rick Peterson had requested that Hogland 
provide BTA a hearing before canceling the building permit. Hogland told him that BTA did not 
have a right to a hearing. Hogland even pointed Peterson to the provisions of the UBC that he 
said precluded a hearing. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3, f 17. 
Hogland admitted in his deposition that by the time he had notified BTA on February 22, 
2003 that its building permit was cancelled, he had actually seen and reviewed the May 15,2002 
MTI inspection report. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 212,l. 4 -p. 213, L. 14. 
vi. Subsequent Apaeal. 
On February 19, 2003, BTA requested an appeal before the Boise City Council of 
Hogland's decision. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 211,l. 25 - p. 212,). 12 and Ex. 76; R. 
Vol. I., p. 142, Ex. 3, 7 18. The City Council accepted the appeal and conducted a hearing on 
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April 9, 2003, during which it decided to reinstate BTA's building permit. During that April 9, 
2003 hearing, Council member Jordan stated: 
As I reviewed all of the information and all the testimony that we've had on this 
project, it really boiled down to one rather simple issue, and that is, how many 
days had gone on without work being done on the tower. We were provided with 
a document during the last week that showed that there had been a pour on May 
15 which would mean that the permit had not in fact expired, and if the decision 
that we're talking about is whether or not 180 days had passed without work, and 
if, in fact, those 180 days had not passed, then it is difficult for me to find that that 
permit was in fact expired. 
The reinstatement of BTA's building permit came too late. As Mr. Peterson originally 
feared and forecasted in November 2002, the revocation of the building permit, and the adverse 
publicity surrounding it, led to cancellation of a number of pre-sale condominium purchase 
agreements and a withdrawal of further financing efforts on the Project by Marshall. BTA was 
never thereafler able to obtain alternative fmancing. The permit revocation and surrounding 
adverse publicity also caused Mortenson and its subcontractors to cease further work on the 
Project. The Project never recovered and came to an end. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3,1/ 19. 
BTA's costs and investment in the Project is in excess of $12,000,000. When BTA 
purchased the Boise Tower site and obtained a building permit, BTA's expectations were that the 
development would result in a completed condominium tower and that the sales of units would 
recover BTA's costs and investment and also result in substantial profit. To date, BTA has not 
recovered its costs and investment from the property. R. Vol. I, p. 143, Ex. 16 (Second Affidavit 
of Fredrick Peterson in Support of Boise Tower's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Boise Tower's Motion for Summary 
Judgment), 7 3 and Ex. 16. 
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11. ISSUES ON APPEAL. 
A. Whether the Stipulation Agreement is ultra vires and void because the conditions 
of the Agreement exceeded Hogland's authority under the Uniform Building 
Code? 
B. Whether the Stipulation Agreement is void for lack of consideration? 
C. Whether the City and Hogland violated BTA's Constitutional Rights and are 
liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983? 
1. Whether a building permit is a protected property interest? 
2. Whether a hearing was required before BTA's building permit could be 
revoked? 
3. Whether Hogland had final policymaking authority on the particular issue 
of the expiration and revocation of building permits such that the City is 
liable for Hogland's decision? 
4. Whether Hogland is entitled to qualified immunity? 
D. Whether there are questions of fact which preclude the dismissal of BTA's taking 
claim by summary judgment? 
E. Whether there are questions of fact which preclude the dismissal of BTA's tort 
claims against Hogland? 
111. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES. 
A. Standard of Review. 
This case is on appeal from the District Court's order granting summary judgment to the 
City and Hogland. "In an appeal -from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of 
review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm., 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that 
summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admission on 
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file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law . . .." "All disputed facts 
are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Robert 
Comstock, LLC v. Keybank Nut? Assoc., 142 Idaho 568,130 P.3d 1106 (2006). 
B. The Stipulation Agreement is Void. 
The Stipulation Agreement and the requirement that Hogland had to approve financing 
for the Project plainly exceeded the authority granted to Hogland under the Uniform Building 
Code. A case remarkably similar to the [acts of the instant case is Black v. City of Ketchum, 122 
Idaho 302, 834 P.2d 304 (1992). In that case, the Supreme Court of Idaho reversed a trial court 
that had rejected the challenge of property owners to the conditions imposed by the City of 
Ketchum on the vacation of an alley that bisected their property. The property was intended by 
the owners to be developed as a motel. The City approved the vacation by an ordinance but 
required first that a building permit be issued for a motel that had been approved by the City and 
that a loan in the amount of at least $2,500,000 had been funded for the construction of the 
motel. The property owners also signed an estoppel affidavit that stated that the conditions of the 
ordinance were acceptable and would not be challenged by them. 
In a later suit by the property owners against the City of Ketchum, the trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the City on a contract theory. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that the conditions imposed by the City were ultra vires and therefore void. The state 
statute governing vacations granted a city the right to vacate an alley only when it was deemed 
expedient for the public good and only with the proviso that there is no impairment of the right 
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of way, easements, and franchise rights of lot owners and public utilities. There was no authority 
by the City to impose additional conditions on the vacation of the alley. 
Similarly in the instant case, the Uniform Building Code does not contain any provision 
authorizing or requiring a building official, such as Hogland, to condition the granting or 
extension of a building permit, or the performance or continued performance of work under an 
unexpired building permit, on the Building Department's approval of a loan commitment to 
finance construction of the work. The Stipulation Agreement was therefore ultra vires and void. 
Even assuming that the Stipulation Agreement was somehow authorized by law, the 
Agreement would in any event be invalid for lack of consideration. Great Plains Equipment, 
Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 769, 979 P.2d 627, 642 (1999); World Wide 
Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880, 884, 728 P.2d 769, 774 (Ct. App. 1986). The 
purported consideration for the Agreement was the extension of the alleged expired building 
permit for the Project. However, it was clear that the building permit had not yet expired. There 
was accordingly no consideration for the stipulation. 
C. Hogland and the City of Boise Violated BTA's Constitutional Rights and Are 
Liable under 42 U.S.C. $1983. 
42 U.S.C. $1983 provides, in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.. .. 
The constitutional rights that were deprived by the City and Hogland were BTA's rights 
to procedural due process. "The right to procedural due process is secured by Article 1, Section 
13, of the Idaho Constitution and by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
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Constitution." Gay v. County Comm'rs, 103 Idaho 626, 628, 651 P.2d 560, 562 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Procedural due process protects the minimum guarantees of notice and a hearing where 
deprivation of a property interest may occur. Bradbuiy v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 
72,28 P.3d 1006, 1015-16 (2001). 
i A Building Permit is a Protected Propertv Interest. 
A property interest exists if state and local law affords a person a "legitimate claim or 
entitlement to the asserted benefit." Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 72, 28 
P.3d 1006, 1015-16 (2001); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Where the 
asserted right is not an application for a building permit but instead a permit that has already 
been acquired, the proper inquiry is whether local law affords a permit holder a legitimate claim 
or entitlement to the continued validity of the permit or whether it can be revoked at the 
unfettered discretion of the government. See, 3883 Connecticut LLC v. District of Columbia, 
336 F.3d 1068, 1072 @.C. Cir. 2003); see also, Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 
1164 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that "a state operating license that can be revoked only 'for cause' 
creates a property interest."); c$ Doran v. Houle, 721 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding 
no property interest in a permit to conduct federally owned tests where the government "retains 
unrestricted discretion over future enjoyment of the interest"). Under the UBC, neither Hogland 
nor the City can revoke BTA's permit at their unfettered discretion. Rather, a permit may be 
revoked only upon a limited number of conditions similar to a "good cause" standard: if it was 
issued in error, on the basis of incorrect or incomplete information, or in violation of an 
ordinance, regulation, or code provision. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, Ex. 46, pp. 1-7 (UBC 
§106.4.5). 
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When faced with nearly identical local law, the court in 3883 Connecticut LLC, supra, 
found that an existing building permit was a property interest. District of Columbia law allowed 
a building permit to be revoked only if the permit was based on false statements, the construction 
did not conform to the permit or construction codes, citations had been issued for violations of 
the codes threatening health and safety, there had been non-compliance with two stop work 
orders, or the contractor's license was terminated. 3883 Connecticut LLC., 336 F.3d at 1073. 
The Court concluded that where revocation of a building permit "is limited to the five 
circumstances listed and . . . depends on whether work is being performed contrary to the 
provisions of the Construction Codes, or unsafely" the code "indicate[s] that [Plainti@ has a 
property interest in the continued effect" of the permits. Id. Consequently, the standards for 
revocation in the UBC, as adopted by the City, confirms BTA's legitimate claim to its permit. 
See id.; Thornton, 425 F.3d at 1164; cf: Doran, 721 F.2d at 1185. A City building permit that 
has already been acquired is accordingly a property interest that cannot be taken without first 
providing due process. See Bradbury, 136 Idaho at 73, 28 P.3d at 1016 ("The procedural 
protection of property guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 'is a safeguard of the security 
of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits."' (quoting Maresh v. Slate of 
Idaho Dep't of Health und Wevare, 132 Idaho 221, 226, 970 P.2d 14, 19 (1998))); 3883 Conn., 
336 F.3d at 1072; Roth, 408 U S .  at 577 (1972). 
. . 
11. No Hearing on the Final Decision to Revoke BTA 's Building Permit was 
Provided Prior to Revocation. 
Procedural due process requires that government seeking to deprive a person of a 
property interest must afford the holder of that interest notice and an opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 
73,28 P.3d 1006, 1015-16 (2001); Aberdeen-Sprin@eld Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82,91, 
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982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999); Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 927, 950 P.2d 1262, 
1266 (1998). Hogland provided no meaningful opportunity in which to demonstrate that the 
building permit had not expired or that there was no authority to revoke the permit. 
BTA was not afforded an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time. "In situations 
where the State feasibly can provide a pre-deprivation hearing before taking property, it 
generally must do so regardless of the adequacy of a post-deprivation tort remedy to compensate 
for the taking." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127, 132 (1990); Armendariz v. Penman, 31 
F.3d 860, 865 (9th Cir. 1994) rev'd in part on other grounds by Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 
131 1 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane). 
In Honey v. Distelrath 195 F.3d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted), the 
Court concluded that pre-deprivation due process was required under Zinermon where "(1) the 
deprivation of iproperty] was predictable; (2) the creation of a pre-deprivation process was not 
impossible; and (3) the deprivation was the result of an official's abuse of his position and 
therefore was not random and unauthorized." Where the government delegates to an official the 
"power and authority to effect the very deprivation complained of," an act is not "unauthorized" 
simply because it was "not an act sanctioned by state law" or constituted "an official's abuse of 
his position." Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 138; see also Honey, 195 F.3d at 534; Armendariz, 31 F.3d 
at 866; Piatt v. MacDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985) (fmding that pre-deprivation 
process is required where "the state has procedures, regulations or statutes designed to control 
the actions of state officials, and those officials charged with carrying out state policy act under 
the apparent authority of those directives."); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1357 (9th Cir. 
1985) ("Where the injury is the product of the operation of state law, regulation, or 
institutionalized practice, it is neither random nor unauthorized, but wholly predictable, 
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authorized, and within the power of the state to control."). Accordingly, the City was required 
to provide BTA with an opportunity to be heard before its building permit was revoked. 
The City argued below that the meetings between Hogland and BTA prior to the 
execution of the Stipulation Agreement, and the Stipulation Agreement itself, are evidence of an 
informal opportunity to be heard. Even if these meetings were adequate process (which they 
were not, as discussed below) they only concerned the City's stop work order based on the 
allegation of 180 days of inactivity. None of these meetings provided BTA with an opportunity 
to oppose the ultimate revocation of its permit when Hogland concluded that the two loan 
commitments presented on January 21, 2003 were insufficient. Notably, in the letter 
accompanying the loan commitments, BTA specifically demanded that if Hogland or the City 
refused to approve either commitment, BTA be given notice of the reasons for that decision and 
an opportunity to respond. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3, Ex. F. Subsequently, Mr. Peterson requested 
that the City provide BTA a hearing before revoking the building permit. R. Vol. 1, p. 142, Ex. 
3, 7 17. Even after being given these explicit reminders of their responsibility to provide a 
meaningful hearing before taking any adverse action, Hogland and the City refused to afford 
BTA an opportunity in which to dispute the ultimate decision to revoke the building permit. Id. 
Instead, on February 11, 2003, Hogland simply sent BTA a letter in which he concluded that 
BTA did not satisfy the loan commitment conditions of the stipulation agreement and revoked 
the building permit. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 208,l. 9 - p. 209, L1. 14 and Ex. 75; R. 
Vol.I,p. 142,Ex.3,1 17. 
Had BTA been given an opporhulity to be heard prior to the revocation of its permit, it 
could have shown that the City's building code does not allow the building official to revoke an 
existing building permit for failure to present proof of financing. This statement ofthe law is not 
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in dispute. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 98, 1. 1 - p. 99, 1. 12. As this was the principal 
reason why Hogland revoked BTA's permit, according to his own letter, an opporhmity to be 
heard on this matter was critical. Additionally, BTA could have, after many rebuffed attempts, 
shown that ihe permit had not expired due to 180 days of inactivity, a fact now conceded by both 
the City and Hogland himself. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 113,ll. 16-23, p. 117,l. 19 - p. 
118, 1. 4, p. 123, 1. 13 - p .  125, 1. 11, p. 126, 1. 23 - p .  127, 1. 16 andEx. 57. Insofar as 
"expiration" was the legal hook on which Hogland hung the permit revocation, an opportunity to 
be heard on this issue was also critical. Because there was no opportunity, however informal, to 
make these or any other arguments against the final revocation, Hogland deprived BTA of its 
property without the required predeprivation due process. See Tri County Indus., Inc. v. Dist. of 
Columbia, 104 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that suspension of a building permit on the 
basis of inaccurate information without an opportunity to rebut afforded no meaningful 
opportunity to be heard before the suspension); Aberdeen-Springfield Canal, 133 Idaho at 91, 
982 P.2d at 926; Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132; Cfi Licari v. Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 347-348 (1st 
Cir. 1994) (finding that a developer's procedural due process rights were not violated when his 
building permits were revoked following a notice that he was not in compliance with a special 
use permit in which he was informed of a hearing on the matter and permitted to respond in 
writing). 
Second, setting aside the fact that earlier meetings between BTA and Hogland before the 
execution of the Stipulation Agreement did not address Hogland's final decision to revoke the 
building permit, those meetings were not in any event an opportunity to be heard in any 
"meaningful manner". Whether an opportunity to be heard is meaningful depends on the 
particular circumstances, according to the Supreme Court's rule of balancing in Matthews v. 
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Eldridge. Bradbury, 136 Idaho at 73, 28 P.3d at 1016 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 334 (1976)); Aberdeen-Sprin$eld Canal, 133 Idaho at 91, 982 P.2d at 926. Under 
Matthews, meaningful process is measured by balancing the nature and significance of the 
property interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the likelihood that additional process 
would have reduced that risk, and the government's interest in speedy and cost-effective 
administration. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
Under Matthews there can be little doubt that the one-sided and coercive "meetings" 
between Peterson and Hogland were not a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The importance 
and value of BTA's property interest are extraordinary. See Tui County Indus., Inc. v. Dist. of 
Columbia, 104 F.3d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The property interest here - the entitlement to 
continue construction without unfair interference - is substantial; any interruption of 
construction is likely to be very costly.") The revocation of the building permit and the adverse 
publicity surrounding it led to the cancellation of presale condominium agreements and the 
withdrawal of further financing efforts by the Marshall. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3, 7 19. The 
damages attributable to the revocation of the building permit include the failure of BTA to 
recover its costs in the Project, which are in excess of $12,000,000. R. Vol. I, p. 143, Ex. 16,T 3. 
The Matthews balancing test contemplates what the value and risk were when the deprivation 
occurred, and rightly so since, as discussed above, the meaningful time for the required process 
was before the deprivation. Second, as became clear, the harm of revocation occurred 
notwithstanding the delayed reinstatement. 
The high risk that the permit would be revoked in error could have been entirely 
eliminated by additional process, at minimal burden to the City. If before the ultimate 
revocation, Hogland had acted as a neutral arbitrator, receiving all facts and arguments, the 
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permit would not have been revoked. This statement can be made with confidence, based on 
undisputed facts, because in its eventual review the City Council concluded that the permit had 
never expired and that the revocation was not lawful. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3,T 18 and Ex. H. 
The facts of this case bear a remarkable similarity to those of Haygood v. Younger, supra. 
In that case, prison officials following the ordinary procedures of their office, which they 
incorrectly believed to represent the correct interpretation of the law, erroneously calculated a 
prisoner's release date. Although the prisoner vigorously attempted to protest the official's 
caloulation of his release date, prison officials would not entertain his arguments. Instead he was 
forced to pursue a post-deprivation habeas corpus action. Huygood, 769 F.2d at 1352-53. The 
Court concluded that "[wlhether this behavior on the part of his keepers was negligent or 
intentional, Haygood's keepers knew that he was protesting his retention in custody. The 
officers beligved that their understanding of the statutes was superior to his. Haygood's response 
was habeas corpus. This took time." Id. at 1358. Consequently, a "denial of due process 
occurred when state officers, through established interpretations of the regulations for setting 
release dates, without affording Haygood an opportunity to be heard, chose to extend his 
custodial period." Id. 
As in Huygood, Hogland revoked BTA's building permit based on his incorrect 
interpretation of the building code's revocation provision and of a critical time period. Like the 
officers in Haygood, Hogland simply believed that his interpretation was correct and refused to 
listen when BTA protested or sought to present evidence and argument that the permit should not 
be revoked. In both cases, only a minimally burdensome hearing would have been required to 
avoid the risk of deprivation inherent in reliance on incorrect law and facts. Also, BTA's only 
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post-deprivation remedy, an appeal to the City Council, took time during which the BTA 
experienced significant injury. Consequently, a due process violation occurred. 
iii. The City is Responsible for Constitutional Violations Because Ho~land, as 
the City's Building Official, Had Final Authoritv to Revoke Building 
Permits. 
In Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Sew. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the 
Supreme Court held that municipalities can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 for violations 
of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Although liability cannot be based solely on the 
doctrine of respondeat superior, acts of municipal agents are sufficient to impose liability if those 
acts fairly represent municipal policy. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Since Monell, courts have made 
clear that even a single unconstitutional act by a municipal official can be off~cial policy. In 
Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), a Supreme Court held that a single act creates 
municipal liability if it is performed by an official who "possesses final authority to establish 
municipal policy with respect to the action ordered." Id. at 480-81. Consequently, if an official 
has general authority to make final policy with respect to the subject matter of his actions, the 
municipality is liable under $1983 for individual unconstitutional acts, even if they were not 
intended to establish a prospective policy. See id.; Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 
(9th Cir. 1992); Lubcke v. Boise City/ADA County ITous. Auth., 124 Idaho 450,458-59, 860 P.2d 
653, 661-62 (1993) (fmding that decisions made by the county housing authority's board, which 
was the final policymaker for that agency, became official policy for which municipal liability 
could be imposed). 
Whether a municipal official is a final policymaker is a question of state law. See Jett v. 
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989); Lubcke, 124 Idaho at 458, 860 P.2d at 661. 
Policymaking authority accrues to an official from several sources, the most important of which 
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is authority granted by state or local statute, regulation, or ordinance. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483; 
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,124 (1988). 
The District Court, relying on Praprotnik, concluded that Hogland lacked final policy 
making authority because the City "retained the authority to measure the official's conduct for 
conformance with their policies." R. Vol. I, p. 88 (quoting Purprofnik, 485 U.S. at 127). The 
District Court also found the case of Carr v. Town of Dewey, 730 F .  Supp. 591 (D. Del. 1990) 
instructive. In Carr, a town's building inspector and the mayor were found to lack final 
policymaking authority because their actions were appealable to the town's Board of 
Adjustment. Although the District Court correctly held in its decision that "neither the Boise 
City Code nor the UBC provided for an immediate appeal following an expiration of a permit", 
the Court nevertheless opined that: 
"IJowever, it is clear that like the building inspector in Carr, Hogland's authority 
was limited and a builder who disagreed with the actions of Hogland had remedial 
options by seeking an appeal through the Boise City Council, which BTA did. Of 
course this was not specifically spelled out but it was a viable option for BTA." 
R. Vol. I, p. 89. 
The District Court also reasoned that Hogland did not possess final policy making 
authority because the City Code $3-05-02 provides that Hogland is responsible for 
recommending policies to the Mayor and the City Council. Although the City Council had 
granted Hogland discretion to implement and enforce the Building Code, "the adopted policy at 
issue here is the UBC [and] this policy was made a final policy by the City Council and the 
Mayor." R. Vol. I, p. 91. 
The District Court erred. There was no right to appeal Hogland's decision before the 
revocation of the building permit. Although Section 105 of the Building Code provides for a 
Board of Appeals, Section 105.2 expressly provides that the Board has no authority to hear 
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appeals of administrative provisions of the code. Section 106 on the expiration and revocation of 
building permits is within Chapter 1 of the Building Code entitled "~dministration".~ R. Vol. I, 
p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, EX. 46, pp. 1-3 - 1-7. 
The fact that the City Council provided a post-deprivation hearing can not shield Hogland 
and the City for the damages suffered by BTA before the reinstatement of the buildmg permit. 
Because the Council's review was an ad-hoc exercise of its discretion, it is insuEcient to negate 
Hogland's final policymaking authority. Neither law nor practice afforded the City Council any 
authority to review the Building Official's rules or policies in administrating the Building Code. 
Indeed, the Council itself admitted that "it's a little bit unusual for us to conduct such a hearing." 
R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 10 (Affidavit of Wendy Burrows-Johnson Regarding Boise City Council 
Transcripts from April 1,2003 and April 8,2003), Ex. A, p. 1. 
The District Court's analysis that the City Council and the Mayor were the find policy 
makers because they had adopted the UBC would effectively immunize any municipality from 
liability under $1983 for actions taken pursuant to authority delegated by an ordinance adopted 
by the municipality. That reasoning was specifically rejected by the Supreme Court. 
As the plurality in Pembaur recognized, special difficulties can arise when it is 
contended that a municipal policymaker has delegated his policymaking authority 
to another official. If the mere exercise of discretion by an employee could give 
rise to a constitutional violation, the result would be indistinguishable from 
respondeat superior liability. If, however, a city's lawful policymakers could 
insulate the government from liability simply by delegating their 
policymaking authority to others, $1983 could not serve its intended purpose. 
Parprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126 (emphasis added). 
The delegation of final authority by the City to Hogland is clear. Hogland was the 
Director of the Building Department. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 11, 11. 6-16. The 
Indeed, Hogland specifically told Peterson that BTA did not have a right to a hearing and pointed Peterson to 
provisions of the code that he said precluded a hearing. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3, i/ 17. 
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Director is also the City's "Building Official", the officer responsible for implementing the 
City's building code. See R. Vol. I ,  p. 142, Ex. 7 (Affidavit of Annette P. Mooney Regarding 
Boise City Code and Ordinances), Ex. A. (Boise City Municipal Code $3-05-02(M), (Q)) 
(stating that the Director of the Building Department is "responsible for all functions assigned by 
law to the building official; to oversee the building plans reviewtinspection activities of the City, 
and to issue permits in conformity with the applicable building inspection laws and codes."); R. 
Vol .1 ,~.  142,Ex.2,Ex.A,p. 12,ll. 8-11,p.42,11. 18-21. 
Section 104.2 of the 1994 Building Code explicitly confers policymaking authority on the 
Building Official with respect to building code provisions. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, Ex. 
46, p. 1-2. That section authorizes and directs the Building Official to enforce the code and 
grants the Building Official the power to "render interpretations of this code and to adopt and 
enforce rules and supplemental regulations in order to clarzfjl the application of its provisions." 
Id. Hogland testified that he had the authority to create policy to interpret and apply the code. R. 
Vol.1,~.  142,Ex.2,Ex.A,p.43,11.4-15. 
Among the code provisions the Building Official enforces are Sections 106.4.4 and 
106.4.5, which describes when a building permit expires and describes the authority of the 
Building Official to suspend or revoke a building permit. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, Ex. 46, 
p. 1-7. Section 104.2 accordingly grants the Building Official the power to make policy and 
rules to enforce and interpret the provisions for the expiration and revocation of building permits. 
R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, Ex. 46, p. 1-2. An example of that policy making authority was a 
decision by Hogland to revoke a building permit in the case of a house that was being 
constructed on Harrison Boulevard in Boise. Although the UBC did not define the quantity of 
work that would be sufficient to avoid the termination of a building permit if work was not done 
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in a 180 day period, Hogland determined that "pound[ing] a few nails every once in a while" was 
not sufficient. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 61,l. 8 - p. 63,l. 9. There is also no definition 
in the UBC of whether the 180 day period is calculated based on working or calendar days. R. 
Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 60,ll. 9-25. Hogland interpreted the Code to require only working 
days to be used in the calculation. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 89,ll. 11-24 
The District Court's reliance on portions of 93-05-02 of the Boise City Code, which set 
forth the general duties of Hogland's position, are not pertinent to the present action. The 
portions of the Code cited by the District Court describe the Director's duties in managing the 
Building Department and its programs, including the duty to recommend policies for achieving 
the mission of the Building Department, which policies must indeed be approved by either the 
Mayor or the City Counsel. However, Section 3-05-02(M) clearly provides that Hogland is 
"responsible for all functions assigned by law to the building official; to oversee the building 
plans reviewlinspection activities of the City, and to issue permits in conformity with the 
applicable building inspection laws and codes". R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 7, Ex. A. Similarly, 
Section 9 3-05-02(Q) provides that Hogland must "perform or cause to be performed all duties 
required by this code or other law of the building official and/or planning director." Id. Unlike 
policies related to the administration of the Building Department, the policies on interpreting and 
enforcing the building code do not require approval from the Mayor or City Council. The 
District Court's code citations are accordingly not relevant to determining whether Hogland had 
final policymaking authority with respect to the particular issue of permit expiration and 
revocation. See, Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978.983 (9'h Cir. 2004)(When determining whether an 
individual has final policymaking authority, we ask whether he or she has authority in 'a 
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particular area, or on a particular issue"', citing McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 
(1997)(emphasis in original)).3 
In Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158 (9' Cir. 2003), a Nevada deputy district attorney had 
offered to drop a questionable obstruction of justice charge against a defendant if the defendant 
signed a waiver of civil liability against Carson City. The defendant later was acquitted of the 
charge and filed suit against Carson City under 42 U.S.C. $1983. Because Nevada law provided 
that the prosecution of a criminal case was in the entire control of a district attorney, the Court 
held that the deputy district attorney was the final policymaker on the decision on whether to 
prosecute the defendant. The Court held the deputy district attorney was the final policymaker 
even though a state statute provided that the state attorney general "may exercise supervisory 
powers over all district attorneys of the state in all matters pertaining to the duties of their 
offices." The Court held that the discretionary and permissive nature of the supervisory 
authority of the state general attorney over the deputy district attorney did not usurp the control 
by the deputy district attorney of criminal prosecutions. 
Hogland's final policymaking authority on the particular issue of the expiration or 
revocation of building permits under the UBC is stronger than the final authority exercised by 
the deputy district attorney in Webb. Unlike the statutory scheme in Nevada, there is no 
provision in the UBC or any other City ordinance that stated that the City or any other party may 
exercise "supervisory powers over [the Building Official] in all matters pertaining to the duties 
of [the building Official]." The authority over the administration provisions of the UBC had 
been delegated by the City to the Building Official, without rights of any appeal and without 
even supervisory control by the City. 
Ironically, the District Court cites in footnote 4 of its decision an example of a County Sheriff provided by the 
Supreme Court in Pembaur which highlights that a municipal employee may be the official policymaker in some 
areas and not in other areas. 
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Lastly, the City by its pleadings in the case is estopped in any event from arguing that 
Hogland was not delegated authority by the City on matters concerning the issuance or 
revocation of building permits. In paragraph 4 of its complaint, BTA alleged that "[alt all times 
relevant, the City of Boise had delegated to Defendant Hogland the authority to act on its behalf 
in matters concerning the issuance or revocation of building permits." R. Vol. I, p. 10. The City 
in its answer admitted that allegation. R. Vol. I, p. 30. This binding admission defeats any 
present claim that elected officials retained authority with respect to the revocation of building 
permits and is a sufficient ground, as a matter of law, for the Court to conclude that Hogland had 
final policymaking authority in this matter. 
iv. Hozland Is Not Entitled to Oualified Immunity: His Actions Violated 
Clearly Established Constitutional Riphts. 
The District Court concluded that Hogland was not personally liable under 42 U.S.C. 
$1983 for his actions because of his qualified immunity. However, a city official is not entitled 
to qualified immunity if (1) his actions violated a constitutional right and (2) that right was 
clearly established such that a reasonable official would recognize that his conduct violated the 
law. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Kennedy v. Ridgefeld City, 439 F.3d 1055, 
1065 (9th Cir. 2006); Rosenberger v. Kootenai County Sherzfs Dep't, 140 Idaho 853, 857, 103 
P.3d 466,470 (2004). As argued above, Hogland's revocation of BTA's building permit without 
a meaninghl predeprivation opportunity to be heard violated BTA's right to procedural due 
process. This satisfies the first element against qualified immunity. 
The City argued below that Hogland's actions were mere negligence and, therefore, not 
actionable under 42 U.S.C. $1983. However, Hogland's liability in this case is not based on 
negligence but instead his intentional actions. The actions at issue are Hogland's issuance of a 
stop work order and the revocation of BTA's building permit. These actions were done 
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consciously and purposefully, with the intent to achieve the desired results (suspension and 
revocation). In both Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,332-33 (1986); Lundgren v. McCall, 120 
Idaho 556, 558, 817 P.2d 1080, 1082 (1991) cited by the City, the plaintiff alleged that the 
official conduct was negligent (carelessly leaving a pillow on stairs and negligence in enforcing a 
fireworks ban, respectively), not intentional actions that violated constitutional rights. In 
Daniels, the Supreme Court held that the negligent conduct alleged by the plaintiff did not state a 
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. $1983. However, the Court expressly distinguished the facts 
fiom an earlier case alleging that intentional conduct had violated the constitution. See Daniels, 
474 U.S. at 333-34 (distinguishing a prior precedent because "the relevant action of the prison 
officials in that situation is their deliberate decision to deprive the inmate of good-time credit . . . 
." (emphasis added)). Hogland's refusal to listen to BTA's position before revoking the permit 
most decidedly was an intentional act that deprived BTA of its constitutional right to due 
process. 
To show that a right is clearly established, the law creating that right must be such that a 
reasonable city officer would be on notice that his conduct is unlawful. Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 
1065; Rosenberger, 140 Idaho at 858, 103 P.3d at 470 ("The relevant inquiry in determining 
whether a right is clearly established is whether it is clear to a reasonable oCElcer that his conduct 
was unlawfid given the circumstances of the situation codronted."); Lubcke, 124 Idaho at 463. 
"[Olfficials are charged with the knowledge of the constitutional developments at the time of the 
alleged constitutional violations, including all available case law." Lubcke, 124 Idaho at 463, 
860 P.2d at 666; see also Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1066 ("We have explained before that the 
responsibility for keeping abreast of constitutional developments rests squarely on the shoulders 
of law enforcement officials." (internal quotation omitted)). Although the right at issue must be 
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examined based on the particular factual context, an official "is not entitled to qualified 
immunity simply because there is no case on all fours prohibiting this particular manifestation of 
unconstitutional conduct." San Jose Chapter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San 
Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). There need not be prior 
authority precisely on point, rather the law at the time the official acted must have provided "fair 
warning" that his conduct was unconstitutional. Id. at 975; see also Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1065 
The right at issue here is BTA's procedural due process right to not have its valid 
building permit revoked without being afforded a meaningful opportunity to voice its objections 
to that action before the revocation occurred. The existing case law provided I-Iogland with fair 
warning that this right was clearly established and that his actions infriiged upon this right. The 
Ninth Circuit has held that it is clearly established that "the Fourteenth Amendment's due 
process clause guarantees the right to a pre-deprivation hearing except where exigent 
circumstances make such a hearing impracticable." Armendariz, 31 F.3d at 869 In Armendariz, 
city housing officials had closed rental properties for purported housing code violations when 
there was no emergency and without first providing the owner an opportunity to be heard. The 
Court rejected the city officials' claims of qualified immunity, holding that the officials charged 
with enforcing the housing code should have known of the clearly established right to a pre- 
deprivation hearing. Id. at 869-70; see also Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1066; Lubcke, 124 Idaho at 
463, 860 P.2d at 666. 
D. Questions of Fact Exist on ETA'S Taking Claim Which Preclude Summary 
Judgment. 
Court Seven of BTA's complaint alleged that the City had taking a property interest of 
BTA without just compensation. Although the District Court dismissed this claim in its 
Judgment, there was no discussion of the dismissal in its decision. 
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To determine whether the City's revocation of the building permit constitutes a 
regulatory taking the court must consider (1) the character of the government action, (2) the 
economic impact of that action on the property owner, and (3) the extent to which reasonable 
investment-backed expectations of property use were destroyed. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); City of Coeur DYlene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 
847, 136 P.3d 310, 318 (2006). While this inquiry is deliberately open-ended and fact specific, 
the proper focus is always on "the severity of the burden that government imposes upon private 
property rights." Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005); Penn Cent. Transp., 
438 U.S. at 124. The fact that the building permit was eventually reinstated does not mean that 
the initial revocation was not a compensable taking. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe 
Reg? Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 335 (2002) (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 
606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)); Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003). In fact, "[tlhe Supreme Court has recognized that property owners should be 
compensated for temporary regulatory takings as well as permanent ones" because "[sluch 
takings are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly 
requires compensation." Seiber v. United States, 364 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church o f  Glendale v. Counly of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 
318 (1987)). Temporary takings are analyzed under the same Penn Central kamework as are 
permanent regulatory takings, and are compensable where the factors demonstrate that 
government action severely burdened a property interest. Cooley, 324 F.3d at 1305 ("In either 
the case of a permanent or a temporary regulatory taking, Penn Central will govern whether the 
initial denial of the permit actually took the property in question." (internal quotation omitted)); 
see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 335. 
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BTA was deprived of two pieces of property by the permit revocation, the permit, which 
is a property interest under the City Code, as discussed above, and BTA's right to develop its 
property as a condominium tower pursuant to the permit. BTA was deprived of each of these 
rights from Febrnary 11, 2003 when the building permit was revoked until April 9, 2003 when 
the City Council reinstated BTA's building permit. Between these dates the building permit had 
no value and BTA was deprived of its development rights. 
The first Penn Central factor, the nature of the government action, requires the court to 
evaluate the procedure by which the government reached its permitting decision and the reasons 
for that action. Cooley, 324 F.3d at 1305 (finding that the trial court must "consider both the 
nature of the permitting process and the reasons for delaying the . . . permit."). The process and 
reasoning employed by Hogland in revoking BTA's permit support a finding that the deprivation 
was severe. First, as discussed above, Hogland employed a constitutionally deficient process. 
BTA had no opportunity to influence the government action and, as a result, it was ill conceived 
and uninformed. Second, the govemment action was based upon an unlawful exercise of 
Hogland's power. Nowhere in the building code is the Building Official authorized to condition 
the use of a building permit on submission of financing commitments or to revoke a permit if 
those commitments were unilaterally deemed unacceptable. Third, the action was not based on a 
legitimate rationale. Hogland insisted at the time that the stop work order was necessary because 
the building permit had expired due to 180 days of activity. As is undisputed now, however, no 
such expiration ever occurred. 
The second Penn Central factor, the economic impact, required the court to evaluate the 
severity of BTA's economic losses. The loss of the permit and the right to develop the land 
resulted in substantial losses, which favor a finding that the property deprivation was severe. 
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First, the permit revocation caused financing, and hence the entire project, to fail. This caused 
BTA to lose the portion of the land's value that derived from the owner's right to construct an 
urban residential and retail tower, assuredly a large value given the return on investment that 
BTA expected from the finished project. Second, BTA lost the value of the capital already sunk 
into the project. That investment exceeds $12,000,000. R. Vol. I, p. 143, Ex. 16,y 3. Third, the 
building permit itself was valuable, representing the investment of substantial monies in 
preparing plans, specifications, and other necessary application materials. 
The final Penn Central factor, whether the taking caused the loss of reasonable 
investment-backed expectations, requires the court to determine that BTA acquired its property 
interests "in reliance on a state of affairs that did not include the challenged [regulation]." See 
Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003); cf: Dodd v. Hood River 
County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that plaintiffs had no reasonable 
investment-backed expectations in the right to build a retirement home on property zoned forest 
use because state law limited development to structures necessary to forest use at the time they 
purchased the land). Here, BTA's expectation that it could use its land and building permit to 
construct a condominium were both investment-backed and reasonable, supporting a finding that 
the property deprivation was severe. As noted above, BTA invested in excess of $12,000,000 in 
securing the property from CCDC and a building permit from the City for the sole purpose of 
constructing a condominium tower. Moreover, the building code provided, and still provides, 
that a permit cannot be revoked except in specific circumstances, none of which occurred. 
Under this law, BTA reasonably assumed that the right to develop land would continue as long 
as the permit was valid. I-Iogland simply revoked the permit before it expired and without 
authority, events that no landowner could reasonably anticipate. Under the Penn Central 
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analysis, the deprivation of BTA's building permit and right to develop its property, though 
temporary, was severe. The court should find that the permit revocation was a taking for which 
just compensation is owed. 
The cases cited by the City below do not detract frorn this conclusion. First, the holding 
of Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council is inapposite. That court found that a temporary moratorium on 
development was not a categorical taking of all beneficial use of property. 535 U.S. at 332. 
However, BTA does not assert that it was deprived of all economically beneficial use of its land. 
The Tahoe-Sierra court specifically refused to consider whether the moratorium amounted to a 
non-categorical "regulatory taking" under Penn Central. Id. at 334. Furthermore, City of Coeur 
D'Alene v. Simpson's statement that takings result from "regulatory actions that are functionally 
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or 
ousts the owner frorn his domain" is consistent with these facts. Simpson, 142 Idaho at 847 n.5; 
see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Znc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). The City, through Hogland 
"appropriated" a building permit and accordingly obstructed BTA's development of its property. 
Therefore, it is correct to conclude that BTA has been "ousted" from its land. 
The preceding discussion makes clear that the City was not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on BTA's constitutional taking claim. Moreover, as the Penn Central inquiry is 
fact intensive, to the extent that any of the facts supporting BTA's right to just compensation are 
in contest, summary judgment for the City was inappropriate. See Anderson v. Spalding, 137 
Idaho 509,513,50 P.3d 1004,1008 (2002). 
E. Questions of Fact Exist on BTA's State Law Tort Claims Against Hogland 
which Preclude Summary Judgment. 
The District Court dismissed Counts Two and Three of BTA's complaint, which alleged 
claims against Hogland for intentional interference with contract and prospective economic 
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advantage on grounds. The District Court did not discuss in its decision the grounds for that 
dismissal. The City below had argued that Hogland was immune from liability under Idaho 
Code §§ 6-904(3) and 6-904B(3). BTA contends that material disputes of fact exist on the 
issues of whether Hogland acted with criminal intent, malice or reckless, willful and wanton 
conduct, and therefore that summary judgment on Hogland's immunity defenses is inappropriate 
and should be denied. 
1. Applicable Law. 
The Idaho Tort Claims Act ("ITCA") sets out the general rule that government employees 
may be held liable for damages arising out of their negligent or otherwise wrongful acts where 
the employees were acting within the course and scope of their employment. I.C.3 6-903(a); 
Brook v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484,488, 903 P.2d 73, 77 (1995); Granl v. City of Twin Falls, 120 
Idaho 69,76,813 P.2d 880,887 (1991). Under the ITCA, liability is the rule and immunity is the 
exception. Rees v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 137 P.3d 397 (2006), 
rehearing denied. 
The ITCA creates exceptions to governmental liability for certain types of claims, 
thereby establishing conditional immunity for governmental agencies and their employees with 
respect to those claims. See 1.C. § 6-904,6-904A, 6-904B, 6-904C; Nelson v. Anderson Lumber 
Company, 140 Idaho 702,99 P.3d 1092 (Idaho App. 2004). 
Idaho Code 3 6-904(3) provides: 
A government entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope 
of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for 
any claim which: . . . (3) arises out of assault, batte ry... malicious prosecution ... 
or interference with contract rights. 
A government employee loses the conditional immunity created by I.C. 5 6-904, and 
therefore is subject to liability for claims arising out of intentional interference with contract, 
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where the employee acts maliciously or with criminal intent. Limbert v. County of Twin Falls, 
131 Idaho 344,346,955 P.2d 1123, 1125 (1998). Sprague v. City ofBurley, 109 Idaho 656,710 
The Idaho Supreme Court has defined "malice" for purposes of the ITCA as "actual 
malice," or "the intentional commission of a wrongfid or unlawN act, without legal justification 
or excuse and with illwili, whether or not injury was intended." (Emphasis added). Anderson v. 
City ofPocatello, 112 Idaho 176,188,731 P.2d 171,183 (1986). The Supreme Court has defined 
"criminal intent" for purposes of the ITCA, as being "legal malice," or "the intentional 
commission of a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse, whether or not 
the injury was intended." Anderson v. Cify of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 187-88, 731 P.2d 171, 
181-83 (1986). Thus, except for the element of "ill will" in malice, the terms "criminal intent" 
and "malice" have been defined under the ITCA to mean the same thing. 
Idaho Code 3 6-904B(3) also affords govemment employees conditional immunity, 
providing: 
A government entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope 
of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and without gross 
negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct, as defined in Section 6- 
904(C), Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim which: ... arises out of 
issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure or refusal to issue, deny, 
suspend or revoke a permit .... 
A plaintiff may prove liability under LC. 3 6-904B(3) by showing that the govemment 
employee acted with either malice or criminal intent or that the city's action was reckless, willful 
and wanton or grossly negligent. C.$ Hunter v. State Dept. of Corrections, Div. of Probation and 
Parole, 138 Idaho 44,57 P.3d 755 (2002) (interpreting I.C. 5 6-904A). Idaho Code 3 6-904C(2) 
defines "reckless, willful and wanton conduct" as being present "when a person intentionally and 
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knowing does or fails to do an act creating unreasonable risk or harm to another, and which 
involves a high degree of probability that such harm will result." 
Since BTA's state law claims against Hogland seek to recover for intentional interference 
with contract, and the related intentional interference with prospective business advantage, and 
since they arise, in part, out of the City's revocation of BTA's building permit, the conditional 
immunities created by I.C. $5 6-904(3) and 6-904B(3) are potentially applicable. So, too, is the 
rebuttable presumption created by I.C. 5 6-903(e), which provides, "for the purposes of this act 
and not otherwise, it shall be a rebuttable presumption that any act or omission of an employee 
within the time and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his 
employment and without malice or criminal intent." 
If a presumption is created by statute, and the statute creating the presumption expressly 
provides the force that presumption will carry, the statute shall govern. Idaho County Nursing 
Home v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 120 Idaho 933, 938, 821 P.2d 988,993 (1991). If, 
on the other hand, as in this case, the statute does not state how the presumption is to be applied, 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 301 shall apply, and the presumption is deemed not to operate as 
evidence, and it disappears from the case upon introduction of evidence as to the matter 
presumed. Bongiovi v. Jamison, 110 Idaho 734,718 P.2d 1172 (1986); State v. Hagerman Water 
Rights Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 736, 745-46, 947 P.2d 409, 418-19 (1997). Thus, under these 
rules, once BTA offers evidence that Hogland acted with criminal intent or malice, the 
presumption of I.C. $6-903(e) that Hogland acted without malice or criminal intent disappears. 
. . 
it. A Fact Dispute Exists as to Whether Hoaland Acted with Criminal Intent. 
To establish that Hogland acted with criminal intent in interfering with BTA's contracts 
and prospective economic advantage, and to rebut the presumption that Hogland did not act with 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 35 
criminal intent, BTA must present evidence to support a conclusion that Hogland intentionally 
committed wrongful or unlawW acts without legal justification or excuse. The following facts 
support this conclusion and raise disputes of fact which preclude summary judgment: 
a. Hogland intentionally directed BTA to stop work on the project on November 8, 
2002, and intentionally forced or coerced BTA to sign a stipulation requiring it to provide a loan 
commitment for financing of the project within 60 days or it would lose its building permit. R. 
Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5 (Boise Tower's Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment), 11 16-17,20-22. 
b. Hogland used an invalid excuse that BTA's building permit had expired because 
of the failure of BTA to do any construction within 180 days, as a pretext to coerce BTA into 
signing an unlawful Stipulation. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5, 17-18. Hogland made an unlawful 
offer, to extend or reinstate BTA's building permit on the condition that it provide the City with a 
signed loan commitment for full project financing within 60 days. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5,77 6- 
9, 17, 18, 20. Hogland also threatened to disclose to the public at a city council meeting that 
BTA's permit had expired if it did not sign the stipulation. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5,121. 
c. Since the City had previously given BTA one 180-day extension of its building 
permit, BTA was not entitled to another extension under the Uniform Building Code. UBC 3 
106.4.4; R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, Ex. 46, p. 1-6-1-7. Had BTA's building permit expired, 
as Hogland advocated, he, as the building official, had no legal authority to extend or reinstate it. 
Id. Using the excuse that the building permit had expired, along with the threat to publicly 
disclose such expiration, in order to coerce BTA into signing the stipulation agreement, was 
therefore without lawful authority. 
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d. As was set forth in the Statement of Facts, the building permit had not expired by 
November 8, 2002, when Hogland directed that work stop. UBC 5 104.2.4 only allows the 
building official to stop work where it is being done contrary to provisions of the building code. 
Since BTA had performed work on the project within 180 days, it was not performing work 
contrary to any UBC provision, and therefore Hogland had no lawful authority to stop work in 
the first place. 
e. Not only did Hogland stop the work, but he refused to let BTA continue any work 
under BTA's valid, unexpired permit, unless or until it signed the stipulation agreeing to furnish 
the City with a loan commitment for full project financing within 60 days. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 
5, 1/20. No provision of the building code grants authority to Hogland, the building official, to 
stop or interfere with work under a valid, unexpired building permit where such work is not 
being done contrary to provisions of the code. Similarly, there is no code provision permitting or 
authorizing the building official to review or approve loan commitments on projects that are the 
subject of valid, unexpired building permits, as a condition of extending, or permitting work to 
continue under such building permits. Hogland admitted these facts. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5,1/1 
6, 18,23. 
f. Hogland revoked BTA's unexpired building permit on February 11, 2003, on 
grounds that BTA did not timely satisfy Hogland's unlawfully imposed condition that BTA 
furnish a loan commitment for full project financing. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5, 7 30. The UBC 
only permits revocation of a valid, unexpired building permit in two very specific and limited 
circumstances: (i) where the permit is issued in error or on the basis of incorrect information 
supplied; and (ii) where the permit is issued in violation of any ordinance, regulation or UBC 
provision. (UBC 5 106.4.5; R. Val. I, p. 142, Ex. 5, 7 6). None of these circumstances apply to 
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Hogland's revocation of BTA's buildmg permit, and the UBC does not, for good reason, permit a 
building official to revoke a valid, unexpired buildmg permit for any other reason. Id. 
Considering these facts as a whole, a jury could reasonably conclude that Hogland's acts 
in stopping work on the project without legal authority, in declaring that BTA's building permit 
had expired, when it hadn't, in advising BTA that the City would reinstate the building permit if 
BTA signed the stipulation, when it had no authority to do so, in unlawfully refiising to let BTA 
proceed with work under a valid, unexpired permit until it signed the stipulation, and in revoking 
BTA's valid, unexpired permit for failing to satisfy conditions which 'Hogland had no legal 
authority to impose in the first place, were wrongful and unlawful, and committed without legal 
justification or excuse. For these reasons, material disputes of fact exist on the issue of whether 
Hogland was acting with criminal intent, and Hogland's motion for summary judgment on this 
immunity issue must be denied. 
iii. A Fact Dispute Exists as to Whether Hopland Acted with Malice. 
To overcome the conditional immunity created by LC. $3 6-904(3) and 6-904B(3), it is 
not necessary to establish that the government employee acted both with criminal intent and 
malice. Evidence that the government employee acted with either criminal intent or malice is 
sufficient to abrogate the conditional immunity and to overcome the rebuttable presumption 
created by I.C. $ 6-903( e). Hunter v. State Dept. of Corrections, Div. of Probation and Parole, 
138 Idaho 44,57 P.3d 755 (2002). 
Under Idaho law, the proof necessary to establish criminal intent under the TCA is the 
same as the proof necessary to establish malice, except that proof of malice also requires the 
additional element of ill-will. Anderson v. City o f  Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 731 P.2d 171 
(1986). Even though BTA does not have to establish that Hogland acted with both criminal intent 
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and malice, a jury could reasonably infer from the following facts that Hogland committed the 
acts outlined above with ill-will and, therefore, malice: 
a. Between May 2002 and November 2002, Hogland received substantial pressure 
from the Boise Mayor, City Council and members of the public to do something about the Boise 
Tower project. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5, f/ 19. Hogland was aware in 200212003 that under the 
UBC, once a building permit has expired for failure to do construction withjn 180 days, it is no 
longer valid and enforceable, and that he, as the building official, would not have any authority 
to reinstate it. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5,1/ 9. 
b. Hogland understood and was aware in 200212003 that under the UBC, so long as 
some work authorized under a building permit is performed within 180 days, the building permit 
may not be deemed expired. Id. Hogland knew and understood in 200212003 that no UBC 
provision gave him as the building official authority to review and approve loan commitments 
for projects which were the subject of existing building permits, as conditions of extending or 
continuing work under those building permits. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5,f/ 23. 
c. Until the Boise Tower project, Hogland had never required review or approval of 
a loan commitment as a condition of granting or extending a building permit, or permitting 
construction to proceed under an unexpired building permit. Neither had he previously made 
closing of a construction loan a condition of extending a building permit or continuing work 
under an unexpired building permit. Id. 
d. Hogland ignored protests of both BTA and Mortenson that the 180-day period had 
not lapsed by November 8, 2002, the date Hogland stopped work on the project, and Hogland 
refused requests by BTA and Mortenson to investigate City records on BTA's construction work, 
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which showed that work was performed within 180 days, to verify that fact. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 
5 , 7  20. 
e. Hogland threatened BTA with public disclosure at a City Council meeting that the 
building permit had expired if BTA did not sign the stipulation agreement, even though BTA's 
building permit had not expired. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5,1/ 21. Hogland refused to allow BTA to 
continue construction unless or until BTA signed tbe stipulation agreement, even though BTA's 
building permit was valid and had not expired. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5, 718, 20. Hogland 
refused to give BTA a hearing before formally canceling its building permit, even though BTA 
requested a hearing before the building permit was canceled. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5, f/il25,32. 
f. Hogland revoked BTA's building permit even though he had previously seen and 
reviewed the May 15, 2002 MTI inspection report and even though he previously knew and 
understood that his pretext for stopping work and coercing BTA into signing the stipulation 
agreement was wrong and without legal authority. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5 ,  7 31. 
Even though BTA does not have to prove actual malice to defeat the conditional 
immunities established by I. C. $ 5  6-904(3) and 6-904B(3), the foregoing facts are sufficient to 
raise an inference that Hogland's acts were committed with ill-will. At the very least, they create 
a dispute of material fact on the issue of actual malice, which precludes summary judgment. For 
these reasons, the grant by the District Court of Hogland's motion for summaq judgment on the 
state law immunity issue must be reversed. 
iv. A Fact Dispute Exists as to Whether Hogland Acted with Reckless. Willful 
and Wanton Conduct. 
Under LC. $ 6-904B, the conditional immunity afforded a government employee may be 
abrogated where the employee acts with malice or criminal intent or reckless, willful and wanton 
conduct. Hunter v. State Dept. o f  Corrections, Div. of Probation and Parole, supra. Therefore, 
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BTA may overcome the immunity afforded Hogland by LC. 5 6-904B(3) by establishing that 
Hogland acted either with malice or criminal intent, or with reckless, willful and wanton 
conduct. Like proof of criminal intent and malice, proof of reckless, willful and wanton conduct 
requires a showing of intentional and knowing acts. In addition, it requires a showing that such 
acts created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, and involved a high degree of probability 
that such harm will result. I.C. 5 6-904C(2). 
Even though BTA does not have to prove reckless, willful and wanton conduct, in 
addition to criminal intent or malice, to overcome the conditional immunity set forth in I.C. § 6- 
904B(3), a jury could infer from the following facts that the intentional and knowing conduct of 
Hogland, outlined in sections E(ii) and (iii) above, created an unreasonable risk of harm to BTA, 
and involved a high degree of probability that such harm could occur: 
a. Hogland was aware that BTA had a construction contract with Mortenson, and 
that Mortenson was the general contractor of the project, performing work even though 
construction financing was not yet firm. Mortenson delivered a letter to Hogland on November 7, 
2002 advising of its intention to resume project construction. Mortenson representative Chuck 
Rauch joined BTA in trying to convince Hogland, without success, that Mortenson had 
performed work on the project within 180 days from the November 8,2002 stop work order. R. 
~ 0 1 . 1 , ~ .  1 4 2 , ~ ~ . 5 , ~  i ,20. 
b. Hogland knew BTA was working with Marshall Investment Group trying to 
obtain a loan to finance construction of the Project. BTA furnished Hogland with a written loan 
commitment from Marshall on January 10, 2003 for the City's review. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5, 
fi 24-26. 
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IV. CONCLUSION. 
BTA request that the Court (a) reverse the denial by the District Court of its summary 
judgment motion and direct that partial summary judgment be entered that Hogland and the City 
are liable under 42 U.S.C.§1983 in depriving BTA of its procedural due process rights, reserving 
to trial the determination of the damages and (b) reverse the grant of summary judgment 
dismissing the other claims of BTA. 
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